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Abstract 
This article examines changing approaches to ethnicity and nationalism of the Lega Nord (LN), a 
populist far-right political party in Italy, against a backdrop of growing anti-EU and anti-immigrant 
sentiment. The article reflects on the contexts in which populist and far right politics are taking hold 
in Italy and in the European Union (EU), with the LN used to illustrate this dynamic. The EU is shaping 
national politics in new and unexpected ways. The article concludes that the LN is seizing the 
opportunity to recast itself in Italy by adopting a national anti-euro, anti-austerity, anti-EU project 
at the same time that populist parties in other member states of the EU are capitalising on deepening 
societal insecurity and growing opposition to the EU, the euro, immigration and EU-imposed 
austerity.  
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Introduction 
The Lega Nord (LN) – which translates as the Northern League – is Italy’s far-right 
anti-immigration, traditionally anti-southern party, and it is currently undergoing a 
major transformation. Under its new leader Matteo Salvini, the LN has softened its 
anti-southern rhetoric, toughened its stance on European integration and the euro, 
and established strong ties with other far right populist parties in Europe. This 
rebranding is perhaps the most significant in the LN’s almost 25-year history. The 
recent election result in the Emilia-Romagna region (on the edge of the LN’s traditional 
heartland of Lombardy, Veneto and Piedmont), where the LN received 19.4% of the 
vote in the 2014 regional election,1 indicates that the LN’s fortunes are improving as 
voters cast their disapproval in a country experiencing de-industrialisation, continuing 
economic malaise, unemployment and political instability. The LN emerged from the 
election in Emilia as the second largest party and the largest party of the right, eclipsing 
Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia (FI) party and Angelino Alfano’s Nuovo Centro Destra 
(NCD) party. Particularly remarkable was the fact that the LN had only managed to 
secure 2.6% of the vote in Emilia-Romagna at the general election in 2013. 2  This 
success is due in part to the populist campaign launched against immigration and the 
                                                        
1 Ministero Dell’Interno Archivio Storico delle Elezioni, 2014, accessed 7 March 2015, 
http://elezionistorico.interno.it/index.php?tpel=R&dtel=23/11/2014&tpa=I&tpe=R&lev0=0&levsut0=0&lev1=8
&levsut1=1&ne1=8&es0=S&es1=S&ms=S 








euro. On the larger Italian stage, a general receptiveness to the problems faced by 
people in southern Italy marks the beginning of a transformation from a regionalist 
party to a far-right, anti-EU nationalist party of the variety seen in other European 
states. 
Opportunistic by nature and tradition, the LN has identified and grasped an 
opportunity to expand its support base. Salvini is steering “il Carroccio”3 southwards, 
venturing tentatively towards the hitherto unfathomable notion of representing 
citizens across the length of Italy. To be sure, calls for federalism and a greater share 
of taxes for the north have not been abandoned, but rather reprioritised behind 
presumed national concerns, such as the abandonment of the euro currency and the 
repatriation of national decision-making power from the European Union (EU). 
Salvini’s exhortation to the interests of national citizens appears somewhat at odds 
with the slogan Prima Il nord (first the north), coined under the leadership of Roberto 
Maroni, current President of Lombardy and former leader of the LN. It is not 
uncommon now for Salvini to appeal to the residents of Naples or Palermo in 
expounding the LN’s anti-EU and anti-immigrant policies. Salvini’s overtures to the 
south may be inspired by political pragmatism, but they are in marked contrast to the 
LN’s firebrand style under its founding leader, Umberto Bossi, which was characterised 
by the unrelenting lambasting of the southerners for most of the ills of Italy. Indeed, 
this new era in the LN’s history may mark the transformation of the LN into a 
traditional far-right party of the kind seen in other parts of Western Europe. Whether 
political expediency and pragmatism will compel the LN to complete its 
metamorphosis into a national party along the lines of the French Le Front National 
will to a large extent determine its political pull in an increasingly anti-EU Europe. 
However, the party that emerges from this process will arguably no longer be the Lega 
Nord, as it will have lost its raison d’etre. Whether Salvini will be coaxed by European 
right-wing populists into completing the transformation or whether the party’s true 
believers will obstruct a change of direction that would negate its northern focus and 
heritage will determine whether the LN succeeds in capturing a large share of the 
growing anti-EU populist vote across the breadth and length of Italy. It is unlikely that 
the party will willingly resume its traditional role as junior partner in future national 
centre-right coalition governments.  
This article will trace the LN’s previous efforts at mobilising anti-state forces in its 
northern heartland and its forays into securing support in bordering regions of Italy 
through means of a pragmatic construction of northern identity. History shows that 
border territories at the edge of Padania4 can be brought into Padania’s orbit, but that 
there are varying degrees of receptiveness to the LN’s appeal to northern 
distinctiveness. The myth of a northern Italian identity has not proved as successful in 
attracting the high levels of support for the LN in border regions as it has in the LN’s 
heartland. Electoral results have consistently shown lower support for the LN in areas 
bordering Padania’s heartland, with declining support the further away the territory 
lies.  
The article will consider the LN’s current prospects for enlarging its support base 
against a backdrop of rising populism and anti-EU sentiment across the EU. The LN’s 
                                                        
3 The LN is often referred to as “il carroccio”. A carroccio was a four-wheeled war altar drawn by oxen and used by 
Italian republics in medieval times. 
4 Padania is the name proposed by the LN for a future independent state comprising the regions in the Po Valley 
or Pianura Padana and surrounding areas. The name carries potent socio-political connotations. 
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new “southern” accommodation phase will be shown to represent a distinct re-
positioning in order to widen the party’s electoral appeal. This shift presages a 
potential new chapter in the development of contemporary Italian identity, informed 
by ideas and sentiments that nurture nationalism, protectionism and dichotomous 
visions of “us” and “them”. The article concludes that while the current circumstances 
hold both the seeds of political growth and destruction for the LN, the LN appears to 
be emerging from the margins and into a position of national prominence from which 
it will wield considerable influence on national agendas and public policy,5  to the 
detriment of pluralism and tolerance of difference.  
A Shifting Focus: Autonomy or Secession? 
Italy is a unitary country with features of federalism. The country has been subject to 
a process of decentralisation for some decades. This is an incomplete process, which 
includes embryonic elements of fiscal federalism. Fiscal federalism and devolution are 
now strongly championed by the LN, which has variously agitated for the secession of 
northern Italy from the rest of the country and federal autonomy. The LN’s name itself 
– Lega Nord per l’Indipendenza di Padania – reveals aspirations that do not sit 
comfortably with the Italian state’s essential objective of national unity. With little 
shared history and culture among its constituent regions,6 the LN has been described 
as “an example of a new and as yet under theorised form of nationalism whereby rich 
peripheries aspire to liberate themselves of the shackles of national solidarity” .7 This 
phenomenon is encouraged by globalisation. As Gold notes, by stressing economic 
competition, globalisation is providing a “greater incentive for wealthier regions to 
secede or at least bargain for more autonomy.”8 
The LN has had varying electoral success over the years, opportunistically 
manipulating its policies for maximum political effect. There have been the inevitable 
miscalculations, but the party has usually recovered from these relatively quickly. After 
a huge success at the 1996 general election, where it achieved 10.1% of votes – as high 
as 29.3% in Veneto and 25.5 % in Lombardy9 – the Lega announced a policy for the 
secession of northern Italy under the name of Padania. This policy, among others, 
proved problematic for the party at the 1999 EP election, resulting in the loss of more 
than half its vote from the 1996 election. A fractured membership and agenda had led 
to numerous defections from the party in the lead up to the 1999 election. Since then, 
the LN has de-emphasised demands for secession, focusing instead on devolution and 
federalism, which enabled the formation of coalition government with Silvio 
Berlusconi. However, despite being holders of Italian ministerial posts in successive 
Berlusconi governments, the party’s leadership has sometimes appeared to struggle to 
restrain its secessionist tendencies and anti-Rome rhetoric. This ability to criticise the 
centralised Italian bureaucracy from the corridors of power has enabled the party to 
maintain its populist identity as a party of protest. Zaslove rightly attributes the LN’s 
                                                        
5 Thomas W. Gold, The Lega Nord and Contemporary Politics in Italy, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, 
p. 130. 
6 The regions in the North of Italy, including the autonomous provinces of Alto-Adige, Trentino and Valle d’Aosta 
are no less distinctive than other regions of Italy.  
7 Michael Huysseune, ‘Landscapes as a Symbol of Nationhood: The Alps in the Rhetoric of the LegaNord’, Nations 
and Nationalism, Vol.16, No. 2, 2010: p. 355. 
8 Gold, 2003, p. 7. 








capacity to retain its combative identity while in power to a special relationship with 
Berlusconi within a heterogeneous governing coalition. Thus, it was able to “attack the 
coalition without fearing repercussions”, “keeping one foot in government while still 
having the other firmly planted outside government”.10 The LN’s ability to occupy a 
position between populism and pragmatism is a characterising feature of the LN’s 
experience of government. 
For the LN’s founder and former leader, Umberto Bossi, the Italian national anthem, 
the Italian flag and other symbols of Italian national identity have often evoked 
derision and contempt. 11  However, this has not prevented the LN’s leaders from 
seeking and obtaining key roles in national government. Bossi occupied the role of 
Minister for Reform in the second and fourth Berlusconi cabinets. As this role includes 
the task of organising the structure of the state, the choice of Bossi, a secessionist, as 
Minister for Reform was a curious decision. Aprile has noted that “[a]ppointing Bossi 
to [this] position …. is like appointing Dracula the director of a blood bank.”12 Roma 
Ladrona (Rome, thief) was a common refrain during Bossi’s Ministerial pursuits, and 
it is this almost surreal spirit of protest and pragmatism that has informed the LN’s 
policies towards Rome, whether within or without government.  
A combination of continuing dissatisfaction with central government institutions and 
unwillingness to endorse transfer payments to the south provides a rationale for the 
LN’s strong advocacy for the reform of fiscal arrangements between Rome and the 
regions, the ultimate goal of which is the financial autonomy of Italy’s twenty regions. 
The LN now advocates the transformation of Italy into a federal state. This policy sets 
it aside from other regionalist parties in Europe, which tend to demand special rights 
for particular regions. While its very name contains a demand for the independence of 
Padania, the LN is difficult to pin down in terms of ideology. Its leaders have described 
the party as being neither of the right nor the left. It currently espouses a Europe of the 
regions and identifies as “Europeanist”, but is also Eurosceptical. It is pro-business but 
anti-globalisation. Its rhetoric is at times racist and supremacist, but it rejects claims 
of racism and xenophobia. Its official policies are more moderate than its rhetoric. As 
noted above, it is difficult to determine whether the party is truly oriented to 
separatism or federalism. One senses that this indeterminacy suits the party 
leadership, who wish to reserve the right to switch the party’s policies according to 
current exigencies. The LN is constantly remaking itself to meet the fresh anxieties of 
its constituency, itself a shifting target. 
Moves Towards Decentralisation 
The Italian parliament endorsed Law 42 on fiscal federalism in 2009, 13  setting in 
motion a determined but slow move towards decentralisation. The law envisaged 
increased tax and spending autonomy of the regions, provinces and municipalities 
(among other things), but a set of legislative decrees has not yet been implemented, 
which means that the policy remains an empty shell. In fact, in some instances, 
                                                        
10 Andrej Zaslove, The Re-Invention of the European Radical Right: Populism, Regionalism and the 
Italian Lega Nord, Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2011, p. 158. 
11 Agnes Poirier, ‘Italy's Eccentric Man of the North’, The Guardian, 18 September 2009, accessed 11 February 
2015, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/sep/17/italy-north-umberto-bossi  
12 Pino Aprile, Terroni, All that Has Been Done to Ensure That The Italians of The South Became “Southerners”, 
trans. I. M. Rosiglioni, New York: Bordighera Press, 2011, p. 298. 
13 Law 42 /2009 is a framework law which sets out the broad elements of reform towards fiscal federalism but 
leaves the implementation to a set of decrees. 
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decentralisation appears to have been reversed. For instance, Italy’s provinces have 
been transformed by Law 56/2014 into “institutional bodies of second level” as a 
prelude to their abolition. With the emergence of an economic crisis of unprecedented 
proportions in post-war Italy and the non-participation of the LN in successive 
national governments since November 2011 (when the Berlusconi government was 
forced to resign amid fears that Italy would be dragged into the Eurozone crisis), the 
process of decentralisation has lost some momentum in favour of market and 
workplace reforms and constitutional changes, such as the reform of the Senate. It 
must be said, however, that many of these changes are regarded as preliminary to the 
implementation of fiscal federalism. 
Despite well-known Italian political peculiarities, significant regional differences and 
inauspicious historical antecedents, autonomy is a principle which has taken root and 
prospered in certain parts of Italy.14  However, at the heart of the LN’s on-and-off 
advocacy for secession and devolution is the enduring belief (not uncommon in richer 
parts of many countries) that it is a gross injustice for the taxes of its people to subsidise 
poorer, “less deserving”, parts of the country. It is beyond the scope of this paper to 
evaluate proposals for fiscal federalism in Italy against established federalist 
principles, but serious debates are yet to be had about the sharing of powers between 
national and sub-national governments, the sources of financing and the fiscal 
equalisation rules. Moreover, the persistence of divisions and antagonism between 
north and south acts as an impediment to the emergence of values, such as respect for 
the autonomy of its constituents, a preference for processes that minimise coercion, 
regional diversity and local participation, upon which successful decentralisation 
rests.15 In the light of enduring political, social and economic problems and divisions, 
perhaps the real issue will be whether appropriate mechanisms can be established to 
mediate and effectively settle conflicts in an emerging federal system in the interest of 
national solidarity, an equitable division of resources among the regions and the 
national interest generally.  
The Lega’s promotion of a distinctive region called Padania  
Founded in 1991 as a federation of regional parties in northern and central Italy, the 
LN is now the oldest political party in Italy, having survived the collapse of the postwar 
political order of revolving Christian Democratic (CD) governments that characterised 
the first republic (1948-1992).16 The LN was a major beneficiary of the new post-1992 
political order. It gained political momentum among the working class in northern 
Italy as its charismatic, firebrand leader, Umberto Bossi, espoused claims of a northern 
regional identity based on a Celtic heritage coupled with populist “anti-southern”, 
“anti-immigrant” and “anti-Roman” rhetoric which maintained barriers between 
north and south and challenged the Italian state’s stated objective of national unity. Its 
oft-repeated mantra of Roma Ladrona and its on-and-off advocacy for a separate and 
                                                        
14 This is particularly true of Italy’s two autonomous provinces with special competences – Trento and Bolzano-
Bozen in the region of Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol. Alto Adige or Südtirol provides a particularly interesting case 
of interest accommodation in a quasi-federal system against a backdrop of cultural and linguistic diversity, while 
simultaneously demonstrating the dynamism of autonomy. 
15 Matt Harvey, Michael Longo, Julian Ligertwood, David Babovic and Darren Parker, Study Guide Constitutional 
Law, Chatswood, NSW: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2014, pp. 143-144. 
16 The second republic was not established through constitutional amendment, but is widely reported as a defining 
political event. The transition from first to second republic is punctuated by the end of the cold war and the 
political upheaval associated with the “mani puliti” (clean hands) operation in which the Italian governing parties 






independent Padania seemed at times to run counter to a pragmatic program of 
accommodation, which saw the LN participate in successive national Berlusconi 
governments from 1994 to 2011. However, this strategy was quite considered and 
purposeful. At times the national political agenda has been driven by the LN’s policies: 
the decisions of the last Berlusconi government to turn around immigrant boats from 
Africa and moves towards the adoption of fiscal federalism through which more taxes 
were to remain in the north are two high profile examples. The more moderate 
elements within the LN seemed to have reached the conclusion during that phase of 
political manoeuvring that the LN’s objectives were better pursued within the 
mainstream political system – and preferably in government – than on the fringes. The 
LN’s ability to maintain its image as a credible party of protest and to differentiate itself 
from other parties within the governing coalition meant that it had nothing to lose. 
The LN has consistently perpetuated the idea of a distinctive folkloristic and cultural 
tradition of a sociopolitical territory which includes part of central and all of northern 
Italy and which has at its heart the Po River (Padus in Latin; hence Padania), which 
etches a course from Piedmont in the west to the Adriatic near Venice in the east. 
Huysseune notes that establishing a Padanian cultural unity is problematic. 17  This 
territory does not have an historical basis, let alone a shared culture, despite the LN’s 
attempts to invest it with a flag (the Sun of the Alps), an anthem (the Va Pensiero 
chorus from Verdi’s Nabucco), various emblems and an ethno-regional identity (Celtic 
origins, industriousness, civic responsibility and integrity). Indeed, northern virtues 
are commonly identified as “a sense of organization, of thrift, of entrepreneurship, a 
work ethic, simplicity and matter-of-factness, respect for promises given, sobriety, 
discretion and moderation”, all of which, as Huysseune conveys, are traditionally 
thought by the LN to be crucially lacking in southerners.18 
Most Italians believe the LN’s construction of Padania is a recent invention,19 though 
this does not attenuate the desire for secession in certain parts of northern Italy. Based 
on its populist, anti-southern and anti-immigrant rhetoric, verging sometimes on 
xenophobia or racism, it is easy to conclude that the construction of Padania aims 
towards divisiveness, differentiation and exclusion. The superiority of the north is 
“systematically associated with its modernity, southern inferiority with its alleged 
backwardness”.20 In the LN’s popular propaganda, the south is associated with Africa 
or described as having a Levantine culture.21 Indeed, it is the purported ethnic or racial 
divide, the fundamental difference in the nature of the people in question – the 
northerners perceived as a Celtic people, the southerners as a Mediterranean people – 
that has informed the LN’s attitudes to southerners and, subsequently, African 
immigrants as lazy and incapable. It is these qualities that purportedly distinguish the 
north’s economic success and dynamism from the south’s relative backwardness.  
Gold observes that the LN “has been effective at presenting northern identity as a 
‘community of interests’ that is threatened by a series of enemies ranging from 
                                                        
17 Michael Huysseune, Modernity and Secession: The Social Sciences and the Political Discourse of the Lega 
Nord in Italy, New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2006, p. 174. 
18 ibid., p. 177. 
19 Trendsetting/ Sondaggio Swg-Affaritaliani.it: gli italiani non credono nella Padania. Ma al Nord prevale il sì alla 
secessione, Lunedì, 28 giugno 2010 - 08:59:00, SWG Dipartimento Opinioni, Affari Italiani, ‘Federalismo e 
Secessione’, Trieste, 25 giugno 2010, accessed 3 October 2012, 
http://affaritaliani.libero.it/politica/padania_sondaggio_swg_secessione250610.html 
20 Huysseune, 2006, p. 177. 
21 ibid. 
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southerners and high taxes to the bureaucracy in Rome.”22 In this endeavor, the LN 
has been assisted by “the fact that the diffusion of industrial districts has consolidated 
regional interests in the north within a tight-knit community”.23 He notes that part of 
the LN’s early success was its ability to mobilise an electorate with similar values 
pertaining to work ethic and entrepreneurship, as well as shared concerns about high 
taxes and bureaucratic red tape, which allowed them to seek a stronger voice for 
northern concerns.24 This strategy relied on the perpetuation of a distinct civil society 
in the north that warranted separate and distinct political representation. It was 
premised on the continuation of a fundamental divide between north and south.  
There have obviously been alternative explanations for the enduring divide between 
the north and south of Italy that do not focus on the sort of racial profiling that the LN 
has undertaken in its popular propaganda. The possibility that Italian policies since 
unification, including the promotion of internal migration in the post-war period from 
south to north to fuel the emerging industrial economy of northern Italy, may have 
contributed to the south’s economic woes does not feature at all in the LN’s explanation 
of northern success and southern failure. Gold explains that the divide is partly 
attributable to the “specific actions of political elites”: specifically, the “clientelist 
policies of the DC … [involving] the trading of state resources for votes” resulting in “a 
dependent south that lacks many of the necessary resources to help autonomous 
growth and development”.25 Rather than viewing the south’s economic problems and 
consequent dependency on the north as a case of institutional or governance failures – 
or, alternatively, as a case of northern hegemony26 or of “uneven development or as a 
distinction between industrial and agrarian regional economies that grew as functions 
of geography and history”27 – the LN’s explanation assumes the racial superiority of 
the northerners vis-à-vis the southerners, although the party usually stops short 
(especially when addressing an intellectual or southern audience) of explicitly 
endorsing conceptions of “biological racism”.28 Yet the LN’s own efforts to draw the 
central Italian “northern periphery” into the Padanian territory underscores the true 
nature of the LN’s project as a movement to aggregate the resources of an economically 
developed region which shares similar socioeconomic values. Padania as a 
geographical area remains heterogeneous and has no common history, but has 
nonetheless achieved relative wealth and economic strength.  
The LN’s previous attempts to enhance its influence by expanding the limits of its 
periphery held the seeds of disintegration, as the internal coherence of its claim of a 
common history, geography and culture was further diluted. The question now arises: 
can the LN remake itself as a national party privileging the value of “autonomy” 
wherever it may appear on the Italian peninsula, or will its foray into a national 
political space signal the demise of its function as a repository for northern pride and 
as a vehicle for the explicit promotion of northern interests and hegemony? 
  
                                                        
22 Gold, 2003, p. 10. 
23 ibid. 
24 ibid. 
25 ibid., p. 123. 
26 Aprile, 2011. 
27 Global South, ‘Antonio Gramsci, the Lega Nord, and Italy’s Southern Question’, 23 November 2010, accessed 7 
March 2015, http://globalsouth12.wordpress.com/antonio-gramsci-the-lega-nord-and-italy’s-southern-question/ 






The LN as a Populist, Ethno-Regionalist Party 
It has been observed that the story of the LN is a complex one: it “cannot simply be 
reduced to the growth of an increasingly xenophobic electorate or a revolt of the rich 
regions”.29 The LN defies simple, one-dimensional characterisations. Thus Diamanti 
has defined it as, above all, federalist.30 Cento Bull and Gilbert have labeled it a populist 
but also an “ethno-regionalist” party.31 Nativist nationalism is another defining feature 
of the party. 32  For its part, the LN presents itself as “supporting a neo-liberal 
revolution” in post-war Italian politics, and from this position it has successfully 
exploited anti-state and anti-party sentiments in Italy.33 The party is now poised to 
exploit widespread anti-EU sentiment, as the Eurozone’s trials and tribulations 
continue to erode public support for the EU. As a pragmatic and populist party the LN 
is moving closer to other radical right nationalist parties in Europe which have 
successfully exploited rising societal insecurity. Cento Bull and Gilbert correctly point 
out that: 
The populist parties of the radical right … have thriven upon the insecurity, 
displacement and psychological crises engendered by the pace of economic change and 
have had great success in attracting the votes of those groups which represent the losers 
in the changes brought about by the process of economic globalization.34 
As predicted by Gold, “globalization and the territorial fissures it causes will also 
provide further fuel for inward looking, xenophobic parties like the Lega Nord.” 35 
Whether traditionally regionalist (like the LN) or nationalist (like the Front National 
in France), populist right wing parties have “mobilized a great deal of support by 
arguing that the current rise in free trade, immigration and multiculturalism is a threat 
to borders, whether national or regional”. 36  For Zaslove, the LN also espouses a 
populist political economy featuring support for the market economy and opposition 
to globalisation and the destruction of local, autochthonous communities.37 In all of 
these representations, the nexus between the LN and populism is established. So how 
is populism defined? 
A highly ambiguous and often confusing term, populism has been applied to a variety 
of political movements, some of which have espoused radical ideologies while others 
have been somewhat conservative “catch-all parties”. 38  For many liberals and 
democrats, populism represents a “political tendency which panders to the reactionary 
and xenophobic instincts of the grass roots, instigating them against the intellectual 
elites”.39 
  
                                                        
29 Gold, 2003, p. 7.  
30 Ilvo Diamanti, ‘L’improbabile ma rischiosa secessione’ Il Mulino, 5/95, 1995: p. 816. 
31 Anna Cento Bull and Mark Gilbert, The Lega Nord and the Northern Question in Italian Politics, Houndmills: 
Palgrave, 2001, p. 48 (citing Biorcio). 
32 Zaslove, 2011, p. 108. 
33 ibid., p. 133. 
34 Cento Bull and Gilbert, 2001, p. 48. 
35 Gold, 2003, p. 129. 
36 ibid., pp. 129-130. 
37 Zaslove, 2011, p. 15. 
38 Cento Bull and Gilbert, 2001, p. 45. 
39 ibid., p. 46 (citing Canovan). 
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Studies on populism have stressed a number of recurring elements in popular movements:  
1. a constant reference to ‘the people’ framed as ‘an organic and homogenous community’ 
sharing common values; 
2. a so-called ‘populism of the little man’ representing the values and beliefs of small 
proprietors who dislike big business and big government and liberal moral values; 
3. a charismatic leader; 
4. a rhetoric of anti-elitism, a dislike of politicians and proneness to conspiracy theories; 
and 
5. a strong tendency towards racism.40 
The LN ticks all of the categories of populism identified above, from the party’s 
trenchant criticism of political elites to its strong tendency towards racism, as well as 
the central role of its charismatic leaders (first Bossi, then Salvini). 
By attributing inordinate value to the racial, ethnic and cultural traits that purportedly 
distinguish Padanians from others, the LN is creating a cultural milieu inimical to 
solidarity among the different peoples within the territory. Indeed, the LN has profited 
from the societal unease that usually accompanies the arrival of large numbers of 
immigrants in traditionally homogeneous societies, its anti-immigrant, populist 
rhetoric striking a chord with many Italians. Italy is currently host to approximately 
5,800,000 regular migrants, 9.7% of the total population, while the annual growth rate 
of migrant presence is among the highest in the EU.41 
Irregular migration represents an even greater source of anxiety. In 2014, 170,100 
asylum seekers arrived on Italian shores,42 most of them on the Sicilian Island of 
Lampedusa. In November 2014, violence towards immigrants erupted in one of 
Rome’s poorest suburbs, Tor Sapienza. Illegal immigrants and asylum seekers had 
been arriving in this area for some time. Their presence had become increasingly 
visible and contentious, as many of the 170,000 irregular migrants rescued by the 
Italian navy in the Mare Nostrum operation in 2014 alone converged on the suburb. 
Local residents protested angrily about increasing neglect from the Italian state in the 
face of rising unemployment and violent crime. Many residents blamed refugees and 
immigrants for their plight as they lamented the support (albeit meager) that refugees 
were extracting from the already financially burdened state: money that would 
otherwise have flowed to them. While the eruption of anger appears rooted in racism 
and xenophobia, it also coincides with vanishing hope in the poorer areas of Italy’s and 
Europe’s large cities. It is this sentiment that plays into the hands of the LN and other 
extremist parties and movements on the right and left of the political spectrum.  
The LN may be accused of feeding the cultural attitudes that presage racism and 
human rights infringements, although the LN rejects all charges of racism. This denial 
is not easily reconciled with assertions such as that of its former leader, Umberto Bossi, 
the Minister of Devolution in 2003, who stated that “Padanians did not work the land 
                                                        
40 ibid. 
41 International Organization for Migration (IOM), ‘Global Migration Flows: Italy, Facts and Figures’ Updated to 
September 2014,, https://www.iom.int/countries/italy,  
42 International Organization for Migration (IOM), ‘Migrant Arrivals by Sea in Italy Top 170,000 in 2014’, 16 







for thousands of years to give it away to Bingo Bongo and the Chinese”.43 Nor can it be 
reconciled with a remarkable claim made in July 2013 by one of the LN’s leaders, 
Roberto Calderoli, that Cecile Kyenge, the Congo-born Integration Minister in Gianni 
Letta’s government, reminded him of an orangutan. Amid calls for his resignation as 
deputy president of the Senate, Calderoli held his ground and insisted that the remarks 
were not racist. Calderoli won the support of senators, who ruled in February 2015 that 
the comments do not amount to racial hate.44 The fact that he remains in his position 
at the will of the Senate arguably reflects poorly on Italian politics and its refusal to 
chastise a leading politician whose comments promote adverse cultural attitudes to the 
promotion of respect for diversity and human dignity in an increasingly divided 
Europe.  
In Italy, Law 205 of 1993, commonly referred to as the Mancino Law, prosecutes acts 
of incitement to racial violence and the propagation of ideas based on racial superiority 
or racial or ethnic hatred. It is also a crime to facilitate the activity of organisations, 
associations, movements, or groups that have this purpose among their objectives. 
Though rare, there have been convictions against politicians for hate speech under the 
law. On 2 December 2004 six elected representatives of the LN (then part of the 
national governing coalition) were convicted of racial hate speech by the first instance 
court of Verona for a campaign perpetrated against the members of the local Sinti 
community in September 2001. The defendants were sentenced to six months 
imprisonment, ordered to pay €45000 in damages and were prohibited from taking 
part in electoral campaigns for three years. This decision gave rise to demands from 
the LN and other right wing groups for the abolition of the rules on hate speech 
contained in the Mancino Law. 45  The Mancino Law has undergone numerous 
amendments since its introduction.46 In January 2006, at the request of the LN, the 
Italian Parliament adopted an act which significantly weakened the penalties for hate 
speech and the instigation to racial discrimination.47 The RED Network Early Warning 
System48 reports that the “Lega Nord frequently uses racist and anti-Romani language 
in public statements”. Furthermore, the European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) has 
                                                        
43 Joao Carvalho, Impact of Extreme Right Parties on Immigration Policy: Comparing Britain, France and Italy, 
London and New York: Routledge, 2014, p. 132. 
44 The Local, ‘Not racist to call black person orangutan’, 6 February 2015, accessed 8 February 2015, 
http://www.thelocal.it/20150206/calling-a-black-person-orangutan-not-racist-senate 
45 European Anti-Discrimination Law Review, Issue No. 1, April 2005, accessed 7 March 2015, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/files/lawrev1_en.pdf, p. 59. 
46 Amendments have been made to also include gender and religious affiliation. The most recent proposal for 
change covered lesbian, gay and transgender rights. The proposal was to make it an offence to instigate or commit 
discrimination or acts of violence on the grounds of “homophobia or transphobia”. The final version of the bill, 
approved in September 2013, included a key amendment. The amendment, known as the Gitti amendment, after 
its initiator Gregorio Gitti of Scelta Civica (the party established by former PM Mario Monti), states that the 
expression of opinion in the context of political, cultural, religious, educational organisations, does not constitute 
discrimination so long as it does not incite to violence. This change has been criticised for its vague wording and 
its nebulousness and for glossing over discrimination at the hands of organisations. See: Isotta Rossoni, ‘The 
Scalfarotto Law and LGBT Rights in Italy’, One Europe, 30 September 2014, accessed 23 February 2015, 
http://one-europe.info/lgbt-rights-italy  
47 RED Network, Indicator history 2011, ‘Nationwide organisations that express racist or xenophobic 
sentiments/discourse’ accessed 23 February 2015, http://www.red-network.eu/indicator-country-
history?id=11&iid=36  
48 The RED Network, is an independent research network building the RED early warning system composed of 17 
Research and Civil Society Organisations in EU Member States. It aims at reporting and documenting racist and 
hate crime and discrimination incidents, as well as positive initiatives and policy responses. RED Network, 
’Monitoring Extremism: European Hate Crime Early Warning System’, 2012, accessed 23 February 2015, 
http://www.red-network.eu/?i=red-network.en.about-us 
Longo, ANZJES 8(1) 
 
26 
reported “a disturbing pattern of racist and anti-Romani speech by Italian public 
officials” with specific reference to the LN.49  
Thus, the LN’s rejection of the accusation of racism and xenophobia has no foundation 
in fact. It is apparent that the personal hardships and struggles of immigrants are not 
assimilated within the LN’s consciousness, which seems to remain aloof from the 
transformative effects of human interaction and shared experience, at least at the level 
of rhetoric.50  
The Post-Bossi era 
On 5 April 2012, Bossi resigned as Federal Secretary of the party (a position he had 
held since the party’s establishment in 1991) in the midst of a scandal in which the 
party’s treasurer was accused of fraud and illegal party financing. The scandal dealt a 
potentially fatal blow to a party founded as a protest movement against fraud and 
corruption in the Italian political system, a point not lost on its opponents. In the face 
of Bossi’s resignation, an interim team of party leaders – Roberto Calderoli, Roberto 
Maroni and Manuela Dal Lago – was appointed to lead the party, but Bossi’s 
resignation signaled a possible transition from idiosyncratic movement into something 
much more common on the Italian and European political scene. The Lega suffered a 
significant loss of electoral support in the 2013 national elections, but has since 
reversed its electoral fortunes. The election of Matteo Salvini as party leader in 2013, a 
shift of focus from secession to anti-euro and anti-immigrant (especially Muslim) 
positions, and a highly visible alliance with France’s Front National have proved 
effective in rebuilding the LN’s electoral appeal, as evidenced by the 2014 regional 
election result in Emilia Romagna. At the time of writing, Matteo Salvini was Italy’s 
second most popular political leader, only marginally behind Prime Minister Matteo 
Renzi.  
In the context of a rapidly changing society and shifting political prospects, Salvini has 
fashioned a new message capable of being accepted by a national audience, in belated 
recognition that southern Italians also vote. To be sure, the message is neither positive 
nor edifying. It is still born of xenophobia and supremacism, and responds to populist 
concerns about globalisation, loss of identity and various manifestations of insecurity. 
Now, however, the vitriol appears to be aimed at non-Italians, non-Europeans and the 
EU. Devoid of anti-Italian sentiment, this new message, which focuses hostility on 
immigrants, the euro, austerity and the EU, is likely to resonate in every corner of a 
country experiencing economic decline and societal insecurity. Whether southern Italy 
will respond positively to the message in the short term is doubtful. The process of 
recasting policies and winning new allegiances in the south is no doubt a medium to 
long-term project.  
The LN within a European Dynamic 
A softening of the LN’s traditional anti-southern position indicates a will to reach 
beyond its heartland and shift towards a more national platform and a common enemy 
                                                        
49 European Roma Rights Centre, ’Campland: Racial Segregation of Roma in Italy’, 3 November 2000, accessed 
23 February 2015, http://www.errc.org/article/campland-racial-segregation-of-roma-in-italy/224 
50 The LN claims success in its governance of cities such as Verona and Treviso with large immigrant populations. 
However, as long as immigrants remain outside the party’s compass (actual or perceived) there can be no claim to 






in Brussels. A wave of anti-immigrant, anti-EU sentiment has seen the further rise of 
far right populist political parties and movements across Europe. Rascism and 
xenophobia are on the increase, presenting real challenges for social cohesion in 
numerous member states of the EU. These challenges threaten to reverse the positive 
cultural effects cultivated through more than half a century of European integration. 
Similarly, negative sentiment for austerity – insisted upon by Brussels and Berlin – is 
playing into the hands of populists in Greece, Italy, France and elsewhere. Austerity is 
sowing the seeds of discontent and reaping bitter harvests, as seen during the Greek 
referendum crisis. Trust in EU institutions has been evaporating for some time. 51 
Eurosceptics throughout the EU are conflating the economic woes in their countries 
with the loss of sovereignty and/or the euro.52 Populists in many member states are 
presenting an alternative vision of European cooperation based on the privileging of 
narrowly construed national over communitarian values and a preference for exclusion 
rather than inclusion.  
In Italy, the LN, Casa Pound and other anti-immigrant parties are gaining support for 
their policies of exclusion in the face of increasing economic pain inflicted by the 
economic crisis. This is not solely an Italian phenomenon, as indicated above. The 
political fortunes of far right political parties in many Eurozone countries have 
improved as a result of the crisis, as the Front National in France and Golden Dawn in 
Greece, among others, demonstrate.53 The popularity of Golden Dawn, a party at the 
extreme end of the spectrum, has increased with the spread of hardship under the rigid 
austerity demanded by the EU in response to the financial crisis.54 Golden Dawn has 
been in existence since the mid-1980s, but it has only become a force in Greek politics 
since the onset of the crisis in 2010. Outside of the Eurozone, the effects of the 
sovereign debt crisis and growing disenchantment with the EU have propelled support 
for nationalist parties such as the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) and 
Hungary’s radical nationalist Jobbik upwards.55 The EU brand is now blemished and 
populist parties are seeking to benefit from rising disenchantment with the EU. Their 
capacity to influence national politics has risen exponentially since the emergence of 
the crisis. Not coincidentally, the LN has adopted a strategy towards Europe that aligns 
more closely to the nationalist politics of its far-right counterparts in Europe.  
The LN’s repositioning vis-à-vis the EU is all the more remarkable because, until 
recently, its position on Europe was one of strong support, especially for its focus on 
regional governance. The EU’s regional policy showcased an attractive model of 
                                                        
51 Citizens have been losing faith in the EU for some time. The Standard Eurobarometer 81 Report, measuring 
public opinion in the EU in Spring 2014, showed that the unpopularity of the European institutions (European 
Parliament, European Commission and European Central Bank) had reached new highs (Eurobarometer 81, 
Spring 2014: pp. 88-89). “The EU is perceived by a majority of Europeans as being over-bureaucratic, responsible 
for austerity, unfair and ineffective in tackling what Europeans consider as two key issues, namely employment 
and purchasing power” (Eurobarometer 81, Spring 2014: p. 104). 
52 Michael Longo and Philomena Murray, The European Union’s Legitimacy Crisis: From Causes to Solutions, 
Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. 
53 Greece's far-right, anti-immigrant Golden Dawn party came third in the January 2015 national election with 
6.3% of the vote, even though its leaders are in detention. See Peter Laurence, “Greek Elections: Jail fails to deter 
far-right Golden Dawn”, Inside Europe Blog, BBC News, 26 January 2015, accessed 23 February 2015, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-eu-30980002  
54 ibid. 
55 Harold D. Clarke notes the agenda setting potential of UKIP: “As election campaign kicks off, UKIP is setting 
the agenda”, The Conversation, 3 February 2015, accessed 23 February 2015, http://theconversation.com/as-
election-campaign-kicks-off-ukip-is-setting-the-agenda-35802. In the Hungarian parliamentary elections in April 
2014, the Jobbik party polled over one million votes securing 21% support, making them Hungary's third largest 
party in the national assembly. See Eszter Zalan, “Hungary's Orban wins another term, Jobbik support jumps”, 
euObserver, 7 April 2014, accessed 23 February 2015, https://euobserver.com/eu-elections/123762  
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regional engagement with Brussels, which potentially allowed the LN to bypass the 
Italian state and interact directly with the EU. The practice of cross-border 
collaboration with like regions across the Alps on a range of regional policy 
programmes in the areas of environmental management, rural development, 
governance, education and culture 56 , among others, held the added promise of 
realignment with other European peoples, with whom the LN claims to share a 
common heritage, on its own terms.  
The LN’s favourable orientation to the EU has been transformed into trenchant 
opposition to the EU’s monetary and economic governance and its inactivity on 
immigration. Salvini has called the euro “a crime against mankind”.57 He criticises the 
EU for its failure to intervene effectively on the immigration crisis, which allegedly 
poses a societal and security threat to Italy. In so doing, the LN has aligned itself with 
a strongly performing Front National in France.58 However, unlike Marine Le Pen’s 
Front National, Geert Wilders’ Freedom Party in the Netherlands or Nigel Farage’s 
UKIP in the United Kingdom, the LN is traditionally constrained by a lack of a national 
platform across the full range of policy areas. With a few high profile exceptions (e.g. 
the island of Lampedusa), the LN has very limited support in the south or, indeed, in 
most regions beyond its heartland. This constraint has come into clearer focus with the 
emergence of Front National as a significant political force in France and a strong 
political force in Europe. The LN’s traditional policies on Padanian independence and 
federalism, as well as its anti-southern rhetoric, have worked to differentiate the LN 
from Le Pen’s party.  
While the LN’s slogan “Prima il nord” echoes on one level the nationalist/supremacist 
ethos of Le Front, the context differs markedly. Within the Italian political context, the 
LN’s message of independence is anything but nationalist. Indeed, independence and 
anti-southern rhetoric restrain the LN’s electoral viability as a national force, even if 
these policies retain their popularity in northern Italy. To be sure, the independence of 
Padania has conveniently been emphasised or de-emphasised by the LN according to 
political exigencies. The LN is currently assessing the independence of Padania as 
dispensable. As long as the LN represents only the north and bordering communities 
in the centre, it cannot entertain the aspirations of a Le Pen, Wilders or other populist 
leaders in Europe. The LN’s penchant for opportunistic shifts in direction suggests that 
a major shift is in the offing. With the launch of the LN’s counterpart in Lazio, southern 
Italy and Sardinia Noi con Salvini (NcS) (Us with Salvini), and the associated apology 
to the south,59 a shift in the narrative of identity and belonging has been invoked. 
                                                        
56 See for instance European Commission Regional Policy, Cohesion Policy 2007-2013, ‘Cross-border programmes 
under the European Territorial Cooperation Objective' accessed 3 March 2015, 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/atlas2007/eu/crossborder/index_en.htm  
57 ‘Lega, Salvini contro euro: “Crimine contro L’umanitá” ’, Ansa, 15 December 2013, accessed 6 June 2014, 
http://www.ansa.it/web/notizie/rubriche/politica/2013/12/15/Lega-Salvini-contro-euro-Crimine-contro-
umanita-_9781968.html 
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The LN has endured on the ever-changing Italian political scene for almost 25 years 
under the same name60 and political message, with only minor variation. It is now 
Italy’s oldest and third largest party, behind Matteo Renzi’s Democratic Party and 
Beppe Grillo’s Movimento 5 Stelle. There is a strong chance that the LN will continue 
to outperform Berlusconi’s centre-right party, Forza Italia, a party riven by internal 
division. Any future coalition between the two parties will highlight the growing 
political resources of the LN. No doubt the LN sees opportunity in the current 
constellation of anti-government, anti-Berlusconi, anti-Euro, anti-austerity, anti-
immigrant and anti-EU sentiment. The LN’s anti-immigrant message is now directed 
squarely at non-EU immigrants in an attempt to neutralise southern indignation, while 
its current stance towards the EU allows it to capitalise on growing distrust of EU 
institutions and economic governance. 
The softening of the LN’s traditional hostility towards the south and its people – 
previously characterised as lazy, incapable, backward and prone to criminality 61  – 
represents an accommodation of the tensions that have wracked north-south relations 
in Italy since the emergence of Bossi’s LN in the early 1990s. The LNs change of 
direction towards a national profile may be understood within the catalogue of changes 
apparent in party-based systems within Europe, whereby parties seek direct 
engagement between citizens and institutions on terms that achieve the most 
immediate electoral gains. These terms may be described as populist. Therefore, the 
LN has tempered its anti-southern rhetoric in recognition that the south represents a 
hitherto untapped opportunity for growth.  
In spite of Salvini’s overtures to the south, there will be multiple hurdles in trying to 
overcome decades of hostility between the LN and ordinary voters in the south. The 
establishment in December 2014 of NcS was met with interest and distrust in equal 
measure. Attempts to organise cartels of politicians sympathetic to Salvini in Sicily and 
the rest of southern Italy will be hampered by the prevalence of popular resentment 
towards him and his party, as well as an ongoing militant debate on southern identity 
(Infoaut 2015), which increasingly acts as a counterweight to popular, LN-inspired 
representations of northern identity. For now, the south remains largely closed to the 
LN’s anti-immigrant, anti-EU cues. Nonetheless, recent national opinion polls have 
tended to show the LN and NcS as the third force in Italian politics, ahead of 
Berlusconi’s Forza Italia. 62  This demonstrates that Salvini’s “national project” is 
resonating with voters. 
The LN’s national project will catapult the LN into the same congested political space 
occupied by a plethora of Italian political parties, large and small. It is likely that 
internal divisions within the LN and between the LN and its sister party, NcS, will 
emerge. It is apparent that the LN is currently well placed to distinguish itself from 
                                                        
60 Italian political parties seem to regularly change their name, whenever a new beginning is perceived to be 
necessary or in response to changing political allegiances.  
61 These and similar polarising caricatures of southern Italians have actually been a mainstay of northern 
propagandists’ analysis of the “Southern Question” since the country’s unification in 1861. See for example, Aprile, 
2011, pp. 255-288. See also Global South, 2010. 
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most other parties by a set of policies that reflects the societal insecurity sweeping 
European societies. However, at some point the LN will need to reassess its raison 
d’être.  
The LN will eventually face a stark choice. Representing a predominantly northern 
constituency will satisfy the party’s grassroots, but will preclude the emergence of a 
national party capable of attracting a new constituency of newly poor, marginalised 
and insecure Italians disenchanted with mainstream national politics, the EU and the 
negative effects of globalisation. On the other hand, to loosen the ties of heritage may 
hold the risk of widespread resentment and voter backlash among the grassroots party 
faithful. The LN has previously moderated its policy on independence because that 
policy held the seeds of destruction for the LN. It polarised supporters rather than 
united them, and clouded their identity. It also precluded power sharing in governing 
coalitions. What the LN does about its position on independence will reveal its long-
term ambitions and prospects. 
The LN is on a path to achieving national prominence. Its current approach of 
organising cartels of interested southern politicians to advance its national agenda is 
open to discussion. How effective this will be in convincing southern Italians of the 
genuineness of the Lega’s national project remains to be seen. Nonetheless, there is an 
incipient dilemma in the LN’s current trajectory which holds the seeds of growth and 
of destruction for the LN. One way or another, the LN will be transformed and so, too, 
will Italian society. 
